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MODERNIZATION AND weAL 
SELF-GOVERNMENT IN PRUSSIAN GERMANY 
GUTSBEZIRKE (MANORIAL DISTRICTS) 
AND THEIR DISSOLUTION 
By Eiji OHNO· 
I 
Dissolution of Gutsbezirke (manorial districts) was not merely one of the issues 
concerning reformation of the local administrative system of Prussia. Its social and politi-
cal significance was so great that the entire structure of Prussian State was at stake.l) 
Attempts for dissolution of Gutsbezirke had already been in existence during the revolution 
of 18482), but it was only towards the end of the Weimar Republic-following the autumn 
of 1928-that the dissolution took place in a thourough, unequivocal manner. This 
thesis intends to study the actual process of the dissolution of Gutsbezirke as a means of 
tracing the evolution of local self-government in Prussia, and in so doing, to cast a 
light upon the historical character of the modernization of the Prussian State. It will, 
hopefully, afford us a clear glimpse of an important aspect of modernization in Germany 
>I< Professor. 
I) Karlheinz Kitzel, Di, Htrrjurthschl Ltmtigemnnti,ordnung, Berlin 1957, S. 65. For the significance 
of the Gutsbezirk in the social~political structure of the German Empire, see Eiji Ohno, The Historical 
Stage of German Capitalism, Tilt K;yoto Uniuersiry E,onomi, Reuiew, Vol. 40, No.2, 1970, pp. 32--43. 
2) Cf. Shinichi Takayanagi, Sangatsu Kakumei ni okeru Preussen Chihojichi,ei Kaikaku (The Prus,ian 
Reform of Local Self-Government in the March Revolution), in: KaMg""u Krnkyu (Study of Public 
Law), Tokyo 1974, pp. 486 ff. 
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as a whole which took a course quite different from that in Western Europe, in that it was 
a "conservative modernization through revolution from above".3) 
It was after the "peasant emancipation" (Bauernbefreiung) in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century that the dualism of structures in Prussian local self-government, as 
represented by the parallel existence of the Gutsbezirk and Landgemeinde (rural commu-
nity), became quite apparent. The Rittergut (knightly estate), which had constituted 
the end unit of the administrative and judicial structures until that time, also ruled pea-
sants' land and formed the so-called "dominialer Herrschaftsbezirk", 4) although the word 
"Gutsbezirk" had not then, seemingly, come into use.o) The peasants' land w~ 
separated from the lords' manor as a result of the "regulation" (Regulierungsedikt vom 
14. September, 1811) which took place in the course of the emancipation, thus establishing 
for the first time the Landgemeinde district as the peasants' autonomous body and resulted 
in the dual existence of the Gutsbezirk and Landgemeinde.6) 
The first trace of legal acceptance accorded to the independent Gutsbezirk is said to 
have been found in the Rural Police Order of 1812 (Gendarmerieedikt vom 30.Juli 1812) 
which refers to "Dominialhof" along with the rural community,7) but it was in the poor 
law (Gesetz iiber die Verpflichtung zur Armenpflege vom 31. Dezember 1842) that the 
Gutsbezirk was clearly specified as the bearer of various obligations under public law in 
line with the Landgemeinde.8) One of the principal reasons for bringing about such a 
legal acceptance of Gutsbezirke was the remarkable increase in their size and number. 
Because of the peasant emancipation, approximately 12,000 Rittergiiter (knightly estates) 
acquired about 1.5 million Morgen of land as compensation. Furthermore, on the 
occasion of the division of the common land (Gemeinheitsteilungsordnung vom 7. Juni 
1821) these Rittergiiter took over the greater part of the common land, of which no more 
than 14% was attributed to peasants. Also, through the breaking up of large estates 
during the agricultural recession, the number of Gutsbezirke increased toO.9) Thus, 
as the Gutsbezirke which included both the Rittergut and those other estates which did 
3) Barrington Moore,]r., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston 1967, p. 436. 
4) Friedrich Keil, Die Lanclgemeinde in den ostlichen Provinzen PreuBens, in: Schrifien desVereinsJur 
Socia/politik, Bd. 43, Leipzig 1890, S. 41. 
5) Eugene N. Anderson & Pauline R. Anderson, Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental 
Europe in the Nineteenth Century, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1967, p. 86. 
6) Edgar Loening, Landgemeinden und Gutsbezirke in den ostlichen Provinzen PreuBens, in: 
Jahrbiicherfiir Nationalokonomie und Statistik, Bd. 43, Jena 1892, S. 179; St. Genzmer, Entstehung und 
Rechtsverhaltnisse der Gutsbe;;irke in den 7 iistlichen Prouin;;en des PreuBischen Staates, Berlin 1891, S. 16. 
7) F. Keil, op. cit. S. 109. The "Gendarmerieedikt" of 1812 aimed at transforming of the Prussian 
Landrat (administrative chief of county) into a sort of French subprefect, but it met with violent ob-
jections and was suspended by the cabinet order of may 19,1814. cf. Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, 
Aristocracy, and AutomMY, Boston 1966, p. 226; Paul Schmitz, Die Entstehung de, PreuBischen Kreisordunung 
,'om 13. Dezember 1872, Berlin 1910, S. 6. 
8) K. Kitzel, of!. cit., S. 16. 
9) Reinhart KoseUeck, PreuBen zwischen R~form und Revolution, Stuttgart 1975, S. 498; vgl. v. NathusiU8~ 
Obornik, Die Zustande und die Reform des landlichen Gemeindewesens in der Provinz Posen, in: 
SdJTjS, Bd. 44, 1890, S. 7f. 
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not have that status became more conspicuous, the dual structure oflocal self-government 
was formed in the eastern part of the Prussian State. 
Notwithstanding the situation in Eastern Prussia, the local self-government system 
in the western part of Prussia had taken on a different aspect. In western Prussia, those 
institutions such as the Landbiirgermeisterei and Westphalia's Amtsgemeinde which had 
been formed under the influence of occupation by France, as well as the Kirchspiel in the 
Marsch (marshland) of Hanover and Holstein along the North Sea coast, and the 
Deichverband which could be found all over the Northwest, were trying to solve the 
problem of the lack in financial capability of individual rural communities by means of 
forming a federation, without losing their own independence, called Samtgemeinde. lO} 
One of the characteristics of these Landbiirgermeistereien was that they contributed 
much toward the realization of equality between towns and villages. Such equality 
between towns and villages in the administration of Rhineland partially resulted from 
such factors as a population density much above that of eastern Prussia, the existence of a 
number of relatively independent peasant communities with well-developed rural industry 
and others characterizing the historical situations of Rhineland, but on the other hand, 
it is a recognized fact that the equality was strengthened by the formation of the Samt-
gemeinde, capable of expenses, by combining small and financially weak rural com-
munities intentionally.11) As it is, the dual structure in the local self-government system 
in Prussia not only existed in the eastern region, but also constituted the difference between 
the eastern and western regions. 12} 
While the separation between Landgemeinden and Gutsbezirke effectively took 
place in eastern Prussia, it did not prevent Gutsherr (manori;'1 lord) from continuing to 
exercise authoritative power (Obrigkeit) as before, not only over the Gutsbezirke but also 
10) Heinrich Heffter, Die Ikutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1969, S. 222f. 
11) Ibid., S. 105. 
12) After the Meiji Restoration, the local se1f-governmentsystem in Japan was developed essentially on the 
Prussian model, under the influence of Rudolf von Gneist and Albert Mosse, as materialized by the 
Municipality Act and Rural Community Act of 1888 and the Prefecture/District Organization Act 
of 1890. The disagreement between Aritomo Yamagata and Kowashi Inoue concerning the reception 
of the Prussian system reflected the antagonism between the Gneist=Mosse theory of integration of 
rural communities (based on the Kreis in eastern Prussia) and the theory of cooperative federation of 
rural communities (based on the Samtgemeinde in western Prussia) advocated by Hennann Roesler. 
See Kouhei Yamada, Kindai Nippon ChihO Jichi Kenkyu Joron (Comparative Study of the Local 
Government in Modern. Japan) in: "Xenky" Xiyo" (The Bulletin) if Nihan Fulcushi Daigulcu (Japan 
University of Social Welfare), No. 27, 1975, pp. 52, 76-77. Yamada states that as the concept of federa-
tion of rural communities was rejected in the end and integraton of rural communities w,as enforced 
with the intention of encouraging self-government of the administrative village not as the natural 
village run by landed farmers of old rural communities but as an administrative unit controlled 
on the bases of parasite landowners who were formed on a larger scale as the result of integration 
of old rural communities "(K. Yamada, op. cit., in: "Kenkyu Kryo', No. 29, 1976, p. 91), there 
was formed a dual structure of natural villages and administrative villages in the local self-government 
system of Japan (ibid., pp. 105-106). Such a dual structure is naturally different from that of the 
co--existence ofLandgemeinden and Gutsbezirke in eastern Prussia. The dissimilarity of the local 
self-government system in modern japan and that of eastern Prussia is very clear. 
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on the Landgemeinden which had previously belonged to the Gutsherrschaft.13} 
The Prussian Constitution of December 5, 1848 granted by the King, the Amend-
ment to the Constitution dated January 31, 1850 as well as the Municipal Government 
Law (Gemeindeordnung fiir den preuBischen Staat vom 11. Marz 1850) abolished the 
patrimonial police power in peasant communities owned by the manorial lord in eastern 
Prussia as an attempt to deny the administrative independence of Gutsbezirke,14} How-
ever, the abolition was prevented by those reactionary laws introduced between 1852 and 
1856. Except for the fact that the patrimonial jurisdiction was abandoned by virtue 
of the ordinance of January 2, 1849 and the law of April 26, 185J15}, the overall situation 
was a "resurrection of the Vormarz status".16} In particular, the law of April 14, 1856 
(Gesetz vom 14. April 1856 betreffend die landlichen Ortsobrigkeiten in den sechs 
6stlichen Provinzen der preuBischen Monarchie) restored the patrimonial police power 
of the Gutsherr in both the Gutsbezirk and in the Landgemeindebezirk, and it also 
empowered the Gutsherr to appoint the village mayor (Schulz) and assessor (Sch6ffe).17l 
The County Ordinance (Kreisordnung) of December 31, 1872 finally abolished the 
patrimonial police power and supervisory power of the Gutsherren over the Land-
gemeinden, and Gutsbezirke as well as Landgemeinden were integrated into cantonal 
districts (Amtsbezirke). 'The chief of a cantonal district (Amtsvorsteher), an honorary 
post, was appointed by the chief of the province (Oberprasident) based upon the list present-
ed by the county assembly (Kreistag), while the village mayor and assessor were to be 
elected by the community itself subject to the approval of the Landrat. The power to 
supervise administration of the Landgemeinden and Gutsbezirke was thus transferred to 
the county executive committee (Kreisausschuss). Loening stated, in this connection, 
that "the Landgemeinde was thus freed from the Gutsherrschaft both on the basis of public 
law and on the political level.. .. The Gutsbezirk now stood against the Landgemeinde 
as an independent ruling body" .18) 
There are, in this respect, different opinions like Schmitz who says that "the new 
, 
13) Vgl. E. Loening, op. ,it., S. 10Sf.: Ludwig Haufier, Die Gesehi,hte der Gruruiherrs'hajt Waldenburg-Neuhaus, 
Breslau 1932, S. 276; Kiyoshi Suekawa, Preussen ni okeru Kishiryo-Shoyusha no "Ohrigkeit" tcki 
Kenri 0 megutte (Concerning the I'authoritative" Rights of the Owners of Ritterguter in Prussia), in: 
"Ritsumeikan Bungaku" (the Bulletin,!! the Faculty oj utters oj Ritsumeikan-Uniuersity) No. 22S, lune 
1964, pp. 41-59. 
14) Vgl. H. Heffler, op. cit., S. 316; S. Takayanagi, .p. ,it., p. 492. 
15) E. Loening, op. cit., S. IS4 Anm. 2. 
16) H. Heffler, op. cit., S. 330f. 
17) F. ~eil, op. ,it., S. 187f.; E. Loening, op. ,it., S.IS4f.; Suruki Akagi, GyoseiSekininno Kenkyu (Study,!! 
Administrative Responsibility), Tokyo 1978, p. 356. Anderson pointed out that" in Austria, the 
revolution of 1848 abolished the vestiges of the lords' conttol over the villages ....... ln Russia at 
emancipation the lords lost all authority over the mir. Prussian and Magyar noble landlords 
retained power over the emancipated peasantry, whether organized as a village community or 
left without political or administrative rights and duties in the manorial district." (E. N. Anderson & 
P. R. Anderson, op. cit., p. 85). These facts would necessitate more detailed, comparative studies 
from a standpoint of social history. 
IS) E. Loening, op. cit., S. IS7. 
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Kreisordnung removed the last residue of old patrimonial administrative order and 
organization based On social status in farm villages" .19) However, such a viewpoint not 
only lacks insight into the reality, pointed out by an author20) that although the Kreis-
ordnung removed "de jure" the patrimonial police power, it did continue "de facto", 
but it completely overlooks the fact that no fundamental change took place as the result 
in the dual structure oflocal self-government system in eastern Prussia. 
Heffter attaches importance to the fact that the demands of liberal groups who 
sought to form the Samtgemeinde also in eastern Prussia as a means of integrating the 
Gutsbezirke were a failure and independence of the Gutsbezirke remained in fact. He 
states that 'junkers, along with the bureaucrats, could rule as before the villages in the 
eastern provinces under the new system of county administration .......... The same large 
landlords who used to enjoy such privileges as Gutsobrigkeit and attending the county 
assembly (Kreisstandschaft) now occupied most of the seats in the Kreisausschuss and the 
posts of Amtsvorsteher .......... the Rittergut, along with the peasant village, still continued to exist 
independently as communal and cantonal district .. ........ The possibility to develop Amtsbezirke 
(cantonal districts) into federations of communal and cantonal districts failed to become 
a reality"21l. Kitzel too emphasizes the complete defeat of the liberals over the issue of 
promulgation of Kreisordnung and the victory of Junkers in establishing a new stronghold 
in the county executive committee (Kreisausschuss): "Adoption of the Kreisordnung 
without regulating the Landgemeinde at the same time meant not just a stalemate for 
the liberals demanding fundamental reorganization of the Prussian administrative system 
and elimination of the Junkers' rule in the eastern Provinces .. .it meant for the liberals a 
significant retreat and worse, a decisive defeat. Although people could not assess the full 
meaning of the retreat at that time, there is no question that for the Junkers, it was a 
complete victory which assured them of their hegemony extending beyond the end of 
Bismarck's regime .......... Not only did Junkers keep everything; they succeeded in building 
a -new stronghold in the Kreisausschuss to dominate rural districts. In other words, the 
Kreisausschuss became thereafter the genuine bearer onocal self-government in the eastern 
Provinces" . 22) 
According to Fujise, the division between Landgemeinde and Gutsbezirk was 
practically accomplished when the Kreisordnung abolished the patrimonial police power. 
He states: "the terminal point and accomplishment of Prussian legislations aimed at 
agricultural reform was reached during the period of revolution from above."23) We 
must remember, however,' that the outcome of the "revolution from above" was under-
stood not as abolition of the dual structure in the local self-government of eastern Prussia, 
19) P. Schmitz, op. cit., S. I. 
20) Hermann Graf von Arnim & Willi A. Boelcke, Muskau, Standesheffschaft zwischen Spree und Neisse, 
Frankfurt/M. 1978, S. 232. 
21) H. Heffter, op. cit., S. 555. 
22) K. Kitze!, op. cit., S. 24. 
23) Hiroshi Fujis., Kindai Doitsu Nagyo no Keisei (Formation of the Modern German Agriculture), Tokyo 1967, 
p.260. 
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but rather as confirmation of its existence. 
Akagi, therefore, considers that the evolution oflocal self-government in Prussia did not 
proceed on the course aimed at by the revolution of 1848. Instead, it became a powerful 
medium connecting the Junkers and the bureaucracy, with the result that "the outcome 
of the 'administrative reform' between 1872 and 1875 can be said, in conclusion, to have 
become the nucleus of crystalization for feudalistic powers instead of becoming the nucleus 
for liberal bourgeoisie who played the role of promoters of the reform".24) 
At any rate, the most important task for us would be to clarify the meaning of the fact 
that the dual structure was securely maintained, and that it constituted the Gutsbezirk as an 
independent administrative unit rather than large scale ownership of land or farm, as· it 
evolved in reality. Max Weber once emphasized that "generally speaking, the Guts-
bezirk gives a much more reliable image of the' social quality of possession' compared with 
scale of land management".25) The question to be asked, indeed, is what precisely was 
the change that took place in the "social quality of possession" in the course of the reform 
of local self-government in Prussia. 
II 
Ludwig Herrfurth, Prussian Minister of the Interior stated in his proposal of the 'new 
Landgemeindeordnung made on November 29, 1890, at the Prussian Landtag (Lower 
House), that the need for a fundamental reform of the local self-government system arose 
from "development of social and economic situations"26), and above all, because of the 
remarkable expansion of the so-called "Leistungsverwaltung" (public administration to 
provide services) such as service to the poor, construction of roads, subsidy to schools, etc. 
in the charge of local community.27) 
There are three types of difficulty identified with regard to the Gutsbezirk: the lack 
of financial capability for services (Leistungsfahigkeit), the disappearance of unity of 
possession (Einheit des Besitzes), and the intermixture (Gemenge) with the Landgemeinde. 
With regard to the financial capabili(p for services, there were 15,600 Gutsbezirke in the 
24) S. Akagi, op. cit., p. 407 j cf. Tsutomu Kitani, Doitsu Daini Teiseishi Kenlcyu (Study of the History of the 
Second German Empire), Tokyo 1977, pp. 107f.; Yasutoshi Ueyama, KemPf; Shakaishi (A Social History 
of German Constitutional Thought), Tokyo 1977, pp. 85-93. Keiichi Kitazumi, Doitsu Daini Teisei· 
Preussen ni okeru Chiho Tochi Taisei (The Prussian Local Government in the Second German 
Empire), in: "Hiigaku Ken9u" (Law Review if the Aichigakuin Universiry), Vol. 21, No. 1-2, 1977, pp. 
261-332. 
25) Max Weber, Agrarstatistische und sozialpolitische Betrachtungen zur Fideikommissfrage in Preussen 
(1904), in: Gesammelte Au/sat,e zur Soziologie und Sodalpolitik, Tilbingen 1924, S. 368 Anm. ,2. 
26) Stenographische Berichte liber die Verhandlungen, Haw der Abgeordneten (Preussen). Neunte Sitzung am 29. 
November 1890. S. 202. 
27) The shift from type of "Ordnungsverwaltung" (public administration to maintain order) to that of 
"Leistungsverwaltung" which accompanies expansion of the function of a state is one of the indicators 
of ideal type of so·called "organized capitalism" (cf. Eiji Ohno, Soshiki Shihonshugi Ron no Mon-
daiten (Problems of the "Organized Capitalism"), in: "Shisjj" No. 625,1976/7, p. 43; Jiirgen Kocka, 
Organisierter Kapitalismus oder Staatsmonopolistischer Kapitalismus? BegrifHiche Vorbemerkun· 
gen, in: H. A. Winkler (Hrsg.), Organisierter Kapitalismus, G6ttingen 1974, S. 23.). As it was, the 
problem was closely related to the development of high-industrialization in Germany at that time. 
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eastern Provinces, of which more than 600 were smaller than 75 ha and more than 800 
were between 75-125 ha in size. Even among those somewhat larger Gutsbezirke, about 
2,000 had the annual revenue of 225 marks or less from the land and house tax which fell 
short of the minimum qualification of large landownership under the Kreisordnung. 
As it is, a considerable number of these 3,400 smaller Gutsberzirke are assumed to have 
had very limited financial capability. As for the second factor, unity qf posseman, which 
had once existed in Gutsbezirke as the total inhabitants were constituted of those who 
depended on estate farming as the center of their life, it was considered to be one of the 
justifications for independence of Gutsbezirke. Nevertheless, the unity was very pro-
bably lost in those 1,300 Gutsbezirke that had 300 or more inhabitants as well as in most 
of those 1,500 Gutsbezirke having integral colonies. Finally, approximately one-third or 
5,000 of the total number of Gutsberzirke were intermixed with Landgemeinden. 2B) 
As for the Landgemeinden of which 24,400 existed in the eastern Provinces, more 
than 1,500 had inhabitants of less than 50. More than 3,000 reported inhabitants of 50 
to 100 each, and the number of inhabitants were 100 to 150 in approx. 3,200 Land-
gemeinden. The majority of these 7,800 Landgemeinden clearly lacked financial capability 
for services. Furthermore, apart from those Landgemeinden intermixed with Gutsbezirke, 
there were an additional 1,300 or more Landgemeinden intermixed with other rural or 
municipal communities. As was the case of intermixture with Gutsbezirke, it was 
maintained that these Landgemeinden should overcome their difficulty by means of 
combination. 29) 
Under these circumstances, legislations were proposed to promote integration of 
rural communities and dissolution of Gutsbezirke, subject to certain limitations, with a 
view to resolving the problems arising from their lack of financial capability for services, 
loss of unity of possession and intermixture of farms and fields. According to the pro-
posal, there were three approaches envisaged to that end, namely, (I) combination 
between an adjacent Gemeinde and Gutsbezirk where they were unable to perform full 
obligations as an independent entity of local self-government, (2) integration of those 
Gemeinden and Gutsbezirke where farms and fields were so intermixed with each other 
that it was no longer possible to distinguish their respective advantages and handicaps as 
different units of local community and (3) transformation of scattered Gutsbezirke and 
colonies within Gutsbezirke into Landgemeinden. At any rate, we can realize the 
character of this reform by the fact of considerable importance that it was actually the 
Kreisausschuss (county executive committee), the very "bastions" of Junkers' interests, 
who were to collect the opinions of those concerned and to promote the program. The 
reform which Herrfurth thought it possible to implement without significant difficulty at 
hand was very lukewarm: (I) combination ofapproxirnately 1,000 Gutsbezirke and 2,100 
Landgemeinden incapable of financing with other Landgemeinden, (2) integration of 
500 or more Gutsbezirke intermixed with Landgemeinden and 500 or more Land-
28) Sten. Ber. (29 Nov. J 890), S. 202f. 
29) Ibid., S. 203. 
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gemeinden intermixed with other Landgemeinden and towns, and (3) transformation of 
about 140 Gutsbezirke into Landgemeinden, which ammounted, all told, to dissolution 
of no more than approx. 1,640 Gutsbezirke.30) 
Herrfurth advocated also the need for Gutsbezirke and Landgemeinden to form the 
ZweckveTbtlnde (local administrative federations with specific purposes) in order to enable 
joint implementation of aid to the poor, education, road construction/maintenance and 
other responsibilities of rural communities, although he showed a negative attitude to 
the idea of forming Landbiigermeistereien (federation of rural communities) as they 
existed in the western part of Prussia. Moreover, .with regard to the election system' of 
eastern Landgemeinden, he insisted on the three-class election system based on valuation 
of assets, and said that those constituent members of the community with an income 
of 660 marks or above should be allowed to have the suffrage and electoral eligibility even 
if they were not permanent residents. 31) No regard was given to the inhabitants of Guts-
bezirk who had no political right to speak of, including the voting right at communal 
elections. Herrfurth further pointed out that the bill had the purpose of "strengthening 
the solidarity in large and small land ownership and encouraging the rural communities 
in the eastern Provinces to promote self-government", and stated that since the Social 
Democratic Party was trying to agitate farm villages under the slogan of "auf die D6rfer" 
(into the villages), "legislations of the State must also be directed to the villages in order to 
stop it".32) This indicates very clearly the nature of "revolution from the above". 
Anyhow, Herrfurth's reform constituted a part of "the New Course" of internal 
policies under the cabinet headed by Leo von Caprivi who succeeded Bismarck following 
the latter's fall which had put the brake on various reforms, along with the bill for elemen-
tary school system presented by the Minister of Education, Gustav von Gossler and the one 
on reform of taxation law proposed by Johannes Miquel, the Minister of Finance. As· 
such, the reform proposed by Herrfurth was considered as the first major trial for both 
the new cabinet and the conservative dominated by the Junkers, as well as for the pro-
gressive factions and the conservative factions within the von Caprivi cabinet. 33) 
Now, we shall see in more detail the social background which necessitated the 
reform of local self-government in eastern Prussia. 
(I) First of all, let us consider the nature of disbursements made by the local 
communities in the seven eastern Provinces. As for Landgemeinde, during the 1888/89 
fiscal year, total disbursements amounted to 33,594.227 marks, of which 7,008,761 marks 
(20.86%) was spent for general administration, 3,909,706 marks (11.64%) for aids to the 
poor, 10,076,220 marks (29.99%) for elementary schools, 4,893,419 marks (14.57%) for 
public roads and 7,706,121 marks (22.94%) for other purposes. This means that 56.20% of 
the total was spent for the poor, elementary schools, and roads. During the same fiscal year, 
30) Ibid., S. 204; vgl. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918, Gottingen 1973, S. 53. 
31) Ibid., S. 204 f. 
32) Ibid., S. 206. 
33) Peter Leibenguth, Modernisierungskrisis des Kaiserreichs an der Schwelle zum wilhelminischen Imperialismus~ 
Dissertation-Koln 1975, S. 147. 
MODERNIZATION AND LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN PRUSSIAN GERMANY 9 
Gutsbezirke spent 11,770,382 marks in total, of which 1,234,681 marks (10.49%) was for 
general administration, 3,382,378 marks (28.74%) was for the poor, 2,294,258 marks 
(24.84%) was for elementary school, 3,387,922 marks (28.78%) for public roads and 
841,142 marks (7.15%) for other purposes. Again, 82.36% of the total expenditures 
was for the three principal domains. 34) As the need for these administrative disbursements 
continued to grow, the lack of financial capacility became increasingly apparent. As an in-
dication of the lack offinancial capability of the local communities, contemporary statistics 
cite those Gutsbezirke smaller than 125 ha, and those others, while larger in size, paying 
annual amount ofland and house taxes less than 225 marks. These Gutsbezirke (3,430 in 
number) represented 21.97% of the total (l5,6l2) in l889, and the ratio was notably 
higher in East Prussia and Silesia.35) With reference to the "Gemeindelexikon", 
we can see that as referenced in Table 1 (I, III) which shows a part of the survey results 
for Silesian Province in 1885, there were, in one part, extremely large Gutsbezirke like 
Gorlitzer Kommunalheide (27,961 hal, while there were, on the other hand, a number of 
Lilliputian and uninhabited ones such as Kaiserswaldau (1 hal. As examples of the 
border line case, Herrfurth cited two Gutsbezirke in Upper Silesia at the third reading of 
his reform bill. One of them was a "purely imaginary Gutsbezirk without any reality, 
and consisting merely of some slopes and obligation to a local school. The other Guts-
bezirk was real, but the land was no more than 16 ha of inferior quality, and yet, it had 
full right and obligation of patronizing the school and church. Both of the Gutsbezirke 
had existed since the beginning of the nineteenth century under the ownership of large 
estates. The owner of the latter transferred the ownership to a shoemaker who had no 
personal assets and because of his inability to patronize, he had to request that the status 
of Gutsbezirk be removed. 36) There are numerous examples of such "caricatures of 
Gutsbezirke"37) as this. 
Situations looked quite similar for the Landgemeinden too. On one hand, there 
were numerous gigantic villages such as Rixdorf in Teltow County near Berlin, known as 
the largest village in the monarchy with the population of 35,827, and S<;honeberg (popula-
tion: 28,844). There were 37 Landgemeinden in Prussia at that time with populations 
in excess of 10,000.38) Table 2 (I) shows the Landgemeinden in Silesian Province having 
a population of more than 5,000. The largest was Langenbielau, a weavers' village in 
Reichenbach. Its population in 1785 already exceeded 6,700, and the settlement ran 
along the highway passing through a mountain valley for a distance of one mile.39) 
Altwasser in Waldenburg was one of the villages which grew first on linen industry and 
34) Anlagen zu den Stenographischen Berichten ilber die Verhandlungen tks Hauses der Abgeordnenten (1890-91). 
Bd. 1. S. 400-403. Tateo Fujimoto, Huene He to Chiso. Kaokuzei Ijo-Ron (Lex Huene and 
Transfer of Land and House Tax to the Local Authorities) in: "Konan Keizaigaku Ronshu" (Konan 
Economic Papers), Vol. 19. No.2, 1978, pp. 54-87. 
35) Anlagen, S. 334f. 
36) St,n. BeT. (20 April 1891), S. 1842. 
37) K. Kitze!, op. cit., S. 39. 
38) Sten. Ber. (20. April 1891), S. 184B. 
39) Johannes Ziekursch, HulUkTt Jahre schlesischer AgraTgeschichte, Breslau 1915, S. 62. 
Table 1. Gutsbezirke in Silesia 
Gutsbezirke Kreis I Land Cultivated Pasture Forest I Population Male Female Area Land 
I Karlswalde 
Hrz. Sagansche Haide Sagan 15 712 ha 12 524 14 966 83 34 49 
Haselbach Sprottau 12 990 I 725 I 396 9503 9 6 3 
Wehrau Bunzlau 10 369 190 399 9 603 70 31 39 
Garlitzer Komrnunalheide Garlitz 27 961 94 I 473 25534 917 458 459 
PleB, SchioB PleB II 842 118 694 10 598 423 192 231 
II . BenlSdorf Hoyerwerda I 687 167 30 I 372 199 606 593 
GroB Stanisch GroB Strehlitz 5800 751 83 4533 I 579 716 363 
Sandowitz Lublinitz 5 842 513 140 4564 2 240 I 088 I 152 
Deutsch Piekar Beuthen I 095 721 89 165 4 679 2294 2 385 
Orzegow Beuthen 366 121 15 156 3653 I 850 I 803 
Schwalzwald, Beuthener Beuthen 546 89 9 387 4 118 2091 2 027 
Schwientochlowitz Beuthen 386 345 17 - I 787 933 854 
Ruda Zabrze 995 368 50 366 I 573 760 813 
Antonienhutte Kattowitz 143 35 I 2 5 116 2505 2 611 
Bittkow mit Hohenlohehiitte Kattowitz 396 202 13 o. I 2 292 I 246 I 046 
Laurahutte Kattowitz 215 54 I 28 9644 4811 4 833 
Michalkowitz, SchloB Kattowitz 471 290 28 7 I 167 616 551 
Siemianowitz Kattowitz 384 264 21 42 I 440 679 761 
Eroanuelssegen PleB 5908 59 185 5 504 I 443 775 670 
ill Gunthersdorf Striegau I 3 I 2 - - - -
Kaiserswaldau Hirschberg I - - - - - -
Eselsberg, Antheil Muskau Rosenberg I - - I - - -
Guttauer Haide Rosenberg I I I - - - -
Rengersdorf (exclave) Rosenberg 3 - 2 I - - -
Schironowitz GroB Strehlitz 5 3 I - - - -
* Gemeindelexikon fur die Pr6vinz Schlesien. Auf GrWld der Materialien der Volkszahlung vom I. Dezember 1885 und anderer amtlicher QueUe 
bearbeitet vom Kaniglich~ statistischen Bq.reau, Berlin 1887. 
Table 2 Landgemeinden in Silesia 
Landgemeinden Kreis I 
Land Cultivated Pasture Forest I Population Male Female Area Land 
I Emsdorf Reichenbach 944ha 767 44 - 6097 2850 3 247 
Langen bielau Reichenbach I 855 I 445 215 37 14 410 6 550 7860 
AItwasser Waldenburg 272 133 25 66 8672 4 359 4 313 
Dittersbach Waldenburg 387 211 40 62 6 573 3345 3 228 
Nieder Hermsdorf Waldenburg 531 216 44 116 6554 3 528 3 026 
WeiBstein Waldenburg 771 437 133 25 6 123 3 087 3 036 
Lipine Beuthen 325 188 5 - 10 454 5 169 5 285 
Alt Zabrze Zabrze 627 459 66 - 9390 4598 4 792 
Biskupitz Zabrze 345 251 18 I 6 470 3 212 3 258 
Klein Zabrze Zabrze 73 37 - - 6 237 3 150 3 087 
Ruda Zabrze 403 276 33 5 6434 3 092 3342 
Zaborze Zabrze 498 341 6 5 12 552 6449 6 103 
Bogutschiitz Kattowitz 534 358 26 2 6 358 3 212 3 173 
Schopinitz Kattowitz 255 147 24 12 5200 2770 2430 
n Riesenthal Trebnitz 4 4 - - 7 4 3 
Karlsruh Steinau 2 0.2 I - 39 15 24 
Webrdorf Miinsterberg 4 3 - O. I 52 22 30 
Graditz, Kolonie Schweidnitz 2 2 - - 191 96 95 
Klein Friedrichsfeld Schweidnitz 3 - - - 288 145 143 
Hummel Striegau 4 3 - - 35 14 21 
N eu Friedersdorf Waldenburg 2 0.4 I - 87 47 40 
Kirchberg Freistadt 2 - - - 53 21 32 
Sch6nbrunn Freistadt 2 2 - - 85 39 46 
Kunzendorf Glogau 4 2 1 O. I - - - (exclave) 
GroG Vorwerk Bunzlau 3 2 0.3 - 35 16 19 
Kirsch BlUlzlau 4 3 0.1 - 32 16 16 
Ober Poitzenberg Lowenberg I - - - 31 15 15 
Neu Bertelsdorf Lauban 4 2 - - 183 84 99 
Gutauer Haide Rothenburg 3 - 3 - - - - (exclave) 
-. * Gemetndelexlkon fur dIe Provmz SchlesIen, Berlm 1887. 
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then on coal mining40), while Zaborze, Lipine and others were villages which developed 
as workers' colonies in the heart of the mining industry in Upper Silesian district.41l 
At antipodes with these excessively large villages, there were a large number of ex-
cessively small ones which very often were no more than mere attachments to large 
Gutsbezirke. Table 2 (n) illustrates, the situation in Silesian Province as an example. 
Schroda County of Posen Province had in 1888 two Gemeinden without any inhabitants, 
and each of the other counties in the Province had many Gemeinden with only a few 
peasants living in them. Some of these tiny communities were in reality annexed to 
adjacent villages and administration was done by the village mayors. Furthermore, a 
number of Gemeinden had reclaimed cultivation land located more than four miles away 
from the village. 42) The existence of so many tiny communities having no capability 
to bear tax and to survive was mostly the outcome of the peculiar characteristics of agrarian 
reform in Prussia, or else--as some historians suggest-it represented the attempts to 
segregate German settlements from Polish Gutsbezirke and to germanize place names.43) 
In addition to these factors, however, we should not forget the problem of "Landflucht" 
(rural exodus) which increased along with the German industrialization in the mid-
nineteenth century, further promoting the decrease of rural population. 
(2) Otto Boldt, who had once been the administrative chief of a county, considered 
that the independence of a Gutsbezirk presupposed unity of possession in that the land-
owner had full title to the property and no one could live in the territory without the 
owner's approval, and that the entire population was in fact structured by the owner's 
intention. He thought that the lack of unity of possession would lead to administrative 
difficulties. 44) This opinion represents a conservative position which admits the dual 
structure in the eastern Provinces as it originally was, and in this connection, it would be 
quite meaningful to see the reality of the loss of unity of possession in Gutsbezirke. 
According to Herrfurth, the majority of Gutsbezirke having population in excess of 300 
and at the same time colonies in them had lost the unity of possession. If we apply the 
yardstick, there were, in 1890, 568 Gutsbezirke that had a population of 301 to 400, 211 
that had a population of 401 to 500, 216 that had a population of 501 to 1,000, and 43 
that had a population in excess of 1,000, while there were 1,524 integral colonies (of which 
211 belonged to the Treasury).45) The loss of unity of possession was particularly signi-
ficant in high-industrialized areas, and among the eastern provinces, Silesia had the worst 
situation. Table 1 (II) shows only those Gutsbezirke in Silesia having populations in 
excess of 1,000, and most of these large Gutsbezirke were found in the mining district of 
Upper Silesia consisting of Beuthen, Zabrze and Kattowitz Counties. 
Seyda, who was a member of the Polish Party shortly before the First World War, 
40) L. Haulier, op. cit., S. 237, 245ff., 364ff. 
41) Walter Kuhn, Siedlungsgeschichte Oherschlesiens, Wiirzburg 1954, S. 254. 
42) Anlagen, S. 275. 
43) K. Kitze!, op. cit., S. 37. 
44) Otto Boldt, ZUT Neuregelung des liindlichen Gemeindewesens, Berlin 1890, S. Sf. 
45) Anlagen, S. 273. 
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made an interesting statement at the Prussian Landtag concerning the problems with 
those Gutsbezirke in the mining district. It shows that the problems still persisted at 
that time. 
He pointed out that among those unusual Gutsbezirke which had lost their unity of 
possession, there were two types. The first type related to those Gutsbezirke in which 
not merely colonies but towns had been formed, and the second type included those in 
which there existed only mining and manufacturing facilities, plants and housing for 
upper class employees of the companies while the labor population was forced to live in 
adjacent Landgemeinden. 
The Antonienhiitte district in Kattowitz County was typical of the Gutsbezirke 
belonging to the first type (ref. Table 1 (II)). This area had a population of about 
10,000 in 1912, and apart from farms, there were large mines, zinc refineries, fire clay and 
refractory plants. All administrative and police functions in the Gutsbezirk were in the 
monopoly of an employee who reported directly to the Gutsherr. He had absolute con-
trol over all aspects of the administration of the Gutsbezirk, and other Gutsinsasse (in-
habitants) were completely deprived of a voice in the internal matters, living virtually 
at the mercy of the Gutsherrschaft. A notorious example of the tyranny and exploitation 
was the fact that the Gutsinsasse were compelled to purchase all electricity for lighting 
purposes and a part of the electricity for production from the power station attached to 
the coal mine and owned by the Gutsherr, and this at a price far in excess of the rates 
applied by the Oberschlesisches Elektrizitiitswerk (Upper Silesian Electric Power) to 
the adjacent village of Neudorf. OEW had a power line passing through Antonienhiitte 
district for electricity supplied to Neudorf, but the Gutsherr did not allow the inhabitants 
to take advantage of the OEW line, and the situation was quite similar also for gas and 
water supply. In addition, there was a marked disproportion in tax burden between 
the Gutsherr and Gutsinsasse. Despite the fact that the Gutsherr had a number of large 
factories and residences, he paid only 5,580 marks house tax, while other house owners 
paid almost twice as much taxes for their houses (10,702 marks). The Gutsherr owned, 
on the other hand, mines producing 7.8 million Ztr. of coal, and 365,000 Ztr. of zinc per 
year as well as the factories producing fire clay and bricks, yet his income tax was no more 
than 17,900 marks or only about a half of the income tax paid by the Gutsbezirk's 
inhabitants (34,038 marks).46) 
As typical examples of the Gutsbezirke belonging to the second type, there were 15 
Gutsbezirke including Bobrek in Beuthen County. All of them had coal mines, iron 
works, zinc refineries and other facilities being in Upper Silesian Province. The entire 
labor population of these Gutsbezirke lived in adjacent Landgemeinden, and for this 
reason, the latter had to face disproportionate expenditures for helping the poor and 
for education. The burden on the inhabitants of the Landgemeinden increased in 
proportion to the needs for expenditure. For example, surtax on income tax was said to 
46) Seen. Ber. (26. April 1912), S. 4650f. 
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be 210---260%, while that on land and house tax reached 275-280%.47) 
(3) In the eastern provinces, there were 1,328 Landgemeinden and 4,945 Guts-
bezirke intermixed with other Landgemeinden or towns. Houses in these Gutsbezirke 
were located ahnost side by side with other villages, and moreover, their land intermixed 
with Feldmarken (fieldmarks) of Landgemeinden to such an extent that it was no longer 
possible in many instances to distinguish the Landgemeinde's interests from those of the 
Gutsbezirke on the, level of local self-government. 48) On this problem, Sombart,49) 
owner of a Gutsbezirk and generally considered as an outsider to the National Liberal 
Party, made a policy proposal based on his 10 years' experience from 1838 in the "Separac 
tion." He stated that, firstly, whereas the Gutsbezirke and Landgemeinden used to 
belong to the same Feldmark prior to the separation and forming a farm-pasture com-
munity, it was now claimed that both had to be integrated when and where artificial 
boundaries were established as the result of the separation, and for that reason, "what is 
now important is not what my valued friend Gneist points out, that is, the possibility, but 
the will". 50) 
Secondly, Sombart stated that where an independent Gutsbezirk continued to exist 
to some extent, it should be integrated into an Amt (canton) along with the Gemeinde, 
and the administrative' emphasis of local self-government should be given to the Amt 
having the characters similar to that of such a Samtgemeinde, and further, that in such an 
Amt, cooperation between the Gutsbezirk and the Landgemeinde could be established, 
thus eliminating, above all, the lack of voting right in communal election for 2 million or 
more inhabitants of Gutsbezirke who were regarded as the Parias, so that more could be 
done for their well-being and settlement.51) 
(4) Such a state of the lack of rights for inhabitants of Gutsbezirke was obviously 
not only a problem in communal election. The Gutsherr was actually the only employer 
in the territory and as such, he had the largest influence on the appointment of pastors and 
teachers under his rights and obligations as patron of the churches and schools. More-
over, he exercised various rights in local police and communal matters as the represent-
ative of Obrigkeit. 52) For instance, Paul Hirsch, a member of parliament from the Social 
Democratic Party, stated as late as in 1913 as follows in his comment on the status of 
o brigkei t in Gu tsbezirke: "the true mercilessness of Gesindeordn ung (Servan t Ordinance) 
-which torments, in addition to Gesinde, one-quarter of the entire farm laborers as well-
appears in its reality only in Gutsbezirke, in which the employer or his agents exercise the 
47) Ibid., S. 4654. cr. Makoto Otsuki, Daini Teiseiki no Pommern Shu no Junker teki Tochishoyu (The 
Junker in Pomeranian Province under Bismarck Regime), in: Ryukoku DaigaJcu "Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu 
Nenpo (Annual Bulletin if the Research Institutefor Social Science of Ryukoku University), No.6, 1975, pp. 
146, 164-166. 
48) Anlagen, S. 274. 
49) K. Kitzei, op. cit., S. 121. 
50) Sten. Ber. (29. Nov. 1890), S. 223. 
51) Ibid., S. 224. 
52) G. A. Ritter u. J. Kocka (Hg.), Deutsche Sozialgeschichte, Bd. II: 1870--1914, Munchen 1974, S. 178. 
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power to enforce tentative judgement and compulsory execution as a police organiza-
tion,"53) 
m 
The Landgemeindeordnung proposed by Herrfurth was, as Loening pointed out, 
"completely conservative in character."54) Nevertheless, inasmuch as the proposed law 
touched upon independence of Gutsbezirke in eastern Prussia, it was regarded by the 
conservative groups professing "quieta non movere" as a serious menace to their very 
existence. 
(1) Even among the conservative groups, some of the Landrate (administrative 
chief of county), Amtsvorsteher (chief of cantonal district), Oberprasidenten (chief of 
province) and other administrative officials, there was a bureaucrat wing who had a kind 
of conservative programs for reforming the existing systems based on their experience 
and the need to improve administration. Most of the bureaucrats, however, were op-
posed to substantial elimination of Gutsbezirke and believed that the problem could be 
solved by improvement of the way the current laws were being implemented. Only a 
few administrative officials felt the need for general settlements and land reform. 55) 
A. E. von Ernsthausen was one of the most enlightened of the progressive bureaucrats. 
Since his appointment as the Landrat of Altenkirchen County in Rhine Province in 1851 
till the end of his career in 1888 a' Oberprasident of West Prussian Province, he worked 
for 37 years as an administrative official of Prussia. 56) Von Ernsthausen attended the 
Generalversammlung des Vereins fUr Sozialpolitik held at Frankfurt am Main on 
September 26, 1890 and gave a supplemental report concerning the reform of Land-
gemeindeordnung. 
Von Ernsthausen did not adopt the most radical approach, i. e., to integrate a 
Gutsbezirk and Landgemeinde into a new self-governing community in order to make 
it capable of financing. He recognized, to be sure, the need to improve-such as dissolu-
tion of those Gutsbezirke that had extremely poor financing capability or that had lost 
their unity of possession, or integration of excessively small Landgemeinden. He was 
also aware of the need for local communities to form an intermediary federation (Zwischen-
verband) between these communities and counties without removing in principle the 
dual structure of Gutsbezirk and Landgemeinde. With regard to the choice of the vehicle 
of such Zwischenverband, i.e., whether to opt for a Samtgemeinde which would undertake 
most of the tasks for a self~governing community or for a Zweckverband only responsible 
for a specific purpose such as aids to the poor, construction of r<:>ad, education etc., von 
Ernsthausen stressed the fact that, unlike in the western provinces where the administra-
tive emphasis was on the Landgemeinde, the emphasis in the eastern provinces was on the 
53) G. A. Ritter (Hg.), Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1911, Gottingen 1975, S. 89; vgl. Lage "nd Kampf 
thr Landarbeiler im oslelbirchen Preussen. Bd. II, Berlin 1979, S. 300ff. 
54) E. Loening, op. cit., S. 239. 
55) K. Kitze1, op. cit., S. 59, 63. 
56) Vgl. A. Ernst von Ernsthausen. Erinnerungen cines Preussischen Beamten, Bielefeld 1894, S., 102 ff. 
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Kreis (county). He also pointed out that the Samtgemeinde should not be established in 
a compulsory manner and the Zweckverband might be necessary only for the purpose of 
helping the poor, since road construction, support to schools and so on could be accom-
plished by the subsidy of county, province and State. 57) 
Otto Gierke, Professor of the Berlin University, said in the Plenary Discussion that he 
was in agreement with von Ernsthausen on the key issues, and then gave a few interesting 
comments. He first argued that it was utterly impossible to treat eastern and western 
Prussia uniformly in the matter of local self-government, and that a part of the evolution 
which had taken place in the west was the result of "revolution from below" under the 
influence of the French Revolution as well as of "revolution from above" dictated by the 
absolutism of the members of the Rheinbund (Rhine Alliance), which meant "it was im-
possible to imitate these revolutionary incidents in our eastern Prussia in the course of its 
peaceful development."58) He concluded thus that it would be nothing but a reckless 
adventure in the east to try to integrate large estates into rural communities, and on this 
ground, he directed his criticism in particular to the opinion professed by Sombart. 
As for the choice of Samtgemeinde or Zweckverband, which was the second of the 
major issues along with the dissolution of Gutsbezirke, Gierke also objected to the com-
pulsory establishment of Samtgemeinde, and maintained that the needs could be met 
either by Kreis or Zweckverband. With respect to the election system of the Land-
gemeinde, his position was similar to that of von Ernsthausen. Gierke stressed that the 
classification of suffrage should be based on the hierarchy ofland ownership and tax rate. 59) 
Incidentally, Gierke took interest in the fact that development of mobility of land 
ownership had stimulated on the one hand the concentration oflatifundia and on the other 
hand the growth of dwarf ownership, resulting in the disappearance of the peasants' status 
inbetween the two opposing trends. He supported, in order to prevent the undesirable 
phenomenon, various measures to maintain peasantry such as rente farm (Rentengut), 
inheritance by one child only (Anerbenrecht), creation of homesteads (Heimstattenrecht) 
etc., and stated as follows: "Gentlemen, I believe that what all of us want, namely, that 
the Landgemeinden and peasantry of Germany become a strong barrier against infiltra-
tion of the Social Democrats who are aiming to control the villages, would happen only if 
we are successful in combining the Landgemeinde with the private property of land as 
well as with the complementary ownership by the community and in consequence, only 
if the sense of growing together with the soil survives and continues working not only 
among the peasants but also among the growing number of small-holders, and only if 
community life can be built on the basis of the peasants' occupational association. 60) 
Thus, Gierke, while accepting continuation of the independence of Gutsbezirke in 
the east and maintenance of the dual structure in the system of local self-government, 
favored on the other hand prevention of the dissolution of peasantry and advocated the 
57) Verhandlungen von 1890. Die Reform der Landgemeindeordnung in Preussen, in: SdVjS, Bd. 
47, 1890, S. 36--52. 
58) Ibid., S. 84. 
59) Ibid., S. 85-89. 
MODERNIZATION AND LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN PRUSSIAN GERMANY 17 
need to encourage contin~ation of the wide peasantry. Wouldn't they be incompatible 
desires, however? We sh~uld probably be reminded, in this respect, of a very appro-
priate and critical commeJ Max Weber made in 1904 in his "Betrachtungen zur Fidei-
kommissfrage".61) What he pointed out there concerning the entailed estate (Fidei-
kommiss) could be said to apply to the Gutsbezirk as well. Weber said that the Prussian 
land policy to promote expansion of Fideikommiss-anything but dissolution of the 
Fideikommiss-actually prevented strengthening of the peasant population, and con-
cluded as follows: "to give up the best land to the vanity and to the dominating interests 
of agrarian capitalism-while being the result of the freedom of founding Fideikommiss 
as it was essentially sanctioned by the bill-deprives the best interest of the nation's stand, 
i. e., the best interest of numerous and strong peasant population, of all future promises.62) 
Anyhow, it would have been almost impossible to carry out the domestic settlement 
policy on a large scale and to foster a strong peasantry in the east while the independent 
Gutsbezirke were allowed to exist extensively to maintain the dual structure in the local 
self-government system. 
(2) Kitzel classified the conservatives into three wings of the bureaucrat wing, 
the standing wing and the agrarian capitalist wing. 63) Von Meyer (Arnswalde), con-
sidered to be a typical representative of the standing wing and who once had been a 
Landrat, argued at the Lower House session on November 29, 1890, that the seven eastern 
provinces did not need any comprehensive regulation on rural community and it would be 
sufficient to add new rules from time to time, stressing special characteristics of local 
development which differed from one province to another .. 
Von Meyer stated, with regard to the bill presented by Herrfurth, that it would be 
difficult to justify, at least in principle, allowing those non-residents in the Landgemeinden, 
who were paying as low as 4 marks income tax, to have access to the communal rights 
unconditionally. This could perhaps be necessary in a few exceptional places like Rixdorf 
or Schoneberg near Berlin, but to extend the exceptional case to other areas, where the 
true community of peasants continued to exist extensively, would be a complete mistake. 
In support of the argument, he commented as follows: "I think that the Landgemeinde 
is more properly the Gemeinde of the land rather than that of persons. The latter have 
only a secondary position, and those who live in a Gemeinde without having land owner-
ship are dually dependent on the landowners for their business and other aspects oflife. For 
this reason, those who do not have land have no voice in the Gemeinde."64) Thus, he 
clearly said that a local self-governing body must, above all, be a community of those 
who own the land. 
Von Meyer also stated that as for the integration of Gutsbezirke and Landgemeinden, 
60) Ibid., S. 90. 
61) Eiji Ohno, Doitsu Shihonshugi Ron (German Capitalism), Tokyo 1965, p. 403f. 
62) M. Weber, op. cit., S. 393. 
63) K. Kitzel, op. cit., S. 57. 
64) Sten. Ber. (29. Nov. (890), S. 207. 
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the number of 1,500 which Herrfurth, Minister of the Interior, thought it necessary to 
integrate was excessively large and that a Gutsbezirk should be integrated into a 
Gemeinde only when both existed side by side, forming a same locality. Even if the inte-
gration would seem to be advantageous, either or both the Gutsbezirk and Gemeinde 
might raise objections especially because of the burden of aids to the poor. In short, his 
position was to let Gutsbezirke remain as they had been, as long as possible.65) According 
to von Mayer, the foregone rule of rural districts by the landed gentry of high esteem, 
particularly ruling by social status as typified by the status of propertied and resident Land-
rat, many of whom also owned Gutsbezirke, was the local self-government in its true sense; 
for those who held such a view, the real enemy were the bureaucrats who multiplied as the 
reform of local administration encouraged the bureaucratization. The conservatives 
who belonged to the standing wing therefore stood firm without fearing rupture with the 
government and challenging the disciplines of the Conservative Party.66) 
In contrast to those old-fashioned "Junker mit altern Schrot und Korn", there was a 
new power represented by Wilhelm von Hammerstein, chief editor of the "Kreuzzeitung" 
and Hans von Kanitz, well-known for the Kanitz Proposal, forming the so-called agrarian 
capitalist wing. They belonged to an utterly new type of Junkers who, unlike the old-
fashioned stock, ignored all sorts of decorum. Obviously, and in spite of their rhetoric and 
apparent concern for public welfare and national interests, the main interest of these 
people was to make their own Gutsbezirke more profitable and valuable than other farms 
in the Landgemeinden.67) As it is, in the case of the Landgemeindeordnung, their 
attention was predominantly directed to profit ...... for instance, as to whether a 100 ha 
plot ofland in a Gutsbezirk would constitute a better source of revenue than another plot 
ofland of the same size in a Landgemeinde. Given that all other conditions were equal, 
if a 100 ha plot of land located in a Gutsbezirk represented, for that reason, an asset more 
valuable as well as profitable compared with the other in a Landgemeinde, that was 
sufficient incentive for the agrarian capitalist wing to try to maintain the Gutsbezirk 
system. 
(3) It would seem that such an interest inherent in the agrarian capitalist wing 
could be interpreted as something essentially identical in character to the interest which 
Max Weber called "Agrarkapitalismus"68) in his "Betrachtungen zur Fideikommiss". 
How was agrarian capitalism's urge to make a profit reflected in the local self-government 
system? In this connection, Weber wrote as follows: 
"As it is well known, owners of Fideikommiss are not active in Gemeinden; as owners 
of large estates generally do, they form 'Gutsbezirke' for their own benefit. They leave to 
the peasants most of the education of the laborers at the primary school, they leave also 
to the peasants as many as possible of the tasks of aiding the poor laborers, and if, for 
instance, the peasants complain about the severe damages caused by foreign seasonal 
65) Ibid., S. 208f. 
66) Vgl. K. Kitze!, op. cit., S. 58f.; S. Akagi, op. cit., p. 402. 
67) Vgl. K. Kitze!, op. cit., S. 64 f. 
68) Vgl. M. Weber, op. cit., S. 340 Anm. 2, 255 Anm. 1, 360f., 379, 386 Anm. 1,391 Anm. 2, 393. 
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workers employed by the knightly estate, then the Deputy Minister of Agriculture would 
declare at the House of Lords: 'the Gemeinde's (read: peasants') interests should come 
after that of agriculture (read: ownership of large estates), ".69) 
This expresses clearly the fact that the community's burden in conjunction with aid 
to the poor and primary education was mostly transferred from Gutsbezirk to Landge-
meinde. We are now going to study the problem in more detail. 
According to an address made by Barth (Merseburg), owner of a Rittergut and a 
member of the Liberal Conservative Party at the Lower House session on November 29, 
1890, it had been customary for farm workers either to live in their housing located on 
Gutsbezirk farms or to own small plots of land in their village and commute to the Guts-
bezirk farms. As more workers were attracted from outside, however, it became necessary 
to build workers' barracks, but the barracks were not built in the Gutsbezirk. Instead, 
land was purchased within a Landgemeinde and the barracks were constructed on it, 
because in this way the Landgemeinde was to bear all burden to assist the poverty-stricken 
people who worked for the Gutsbezirk. 
Barth also discussed the so-called "Domanenpachter" (tenants in a demesne of the 
Crown) contract. According to the terms of this contract, the tenant was obligated to 
bear all responsibility for the aid to poor workers he hired during the tenure, and the 
obligation continued for two years after the leasehold had expired. In order to escape 
from the responsibility, the tenant used to make any worker old and likely to become 
unfit for work fairly soon quit the workers' barrack although he was not immediately laid 
off. The worker would then find a room and live in the neighboring village and conti-
nue to work on the farm, so the Landgemeinde could not chase him out. After two 
years, however, the worker would acquire the eligibility to receive aid (Unterstiitzungs-
wohnsitz), and thereupon his employment would be terminated and the charge would 
fall upon the Landgemeinde. 
In an extreme case, an owner of a farm built workers' barracks both in the Gutsbezirk 
and Landgemeinde, and every worker was forced to move his home from one place to 
another at the interval of a year and nine months so that neither the Gutsbezirk nor the 
Landgemeinde were responsible for the aid to the poor. 70) 
In another case, the owner had two Gutsbezirke and the workers were moved from 
one to the other once every year or year and a half, which allowed him to prevent the 
workers from acquiring the eligibility to receive aid. 71) 
Thus, owners of farms and tenants in Gutsbezirke could avoid the charge of helping 
the poor by moving workers in such a way as to deprive them of eligibility. On the 
contrary, Landgemeinden could not restrict inflow of population because of the 
"Freiziigigkeit" (freedom of movement) and were obligated, in consequence, to bear the 
responsibility which should have been on the Gutsbezirke. 
The inequality between Gutsbezirk and Landgemeinde also existed in the area of 
69) Ibid., S. 381. 
70) Sten. Ber. (29 Nov. 1890), S. 211f. 
71) E. Loening, op. cit., S. 206. 
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road construction. The State and the provinces were responsible for construction and 
maintenance of national and military roads, for which inhabitants of Landgemeinden 
and those of Gutsbezirke had to provide manual labor and animals, while owners of 
Gutsbezirke and inhabitants of towns were exempt from this obligation. The only 
exception was the province of Posen in which the law of June 21, 1875, eliminated the 
inequality, and the obligation (Hand-und Spanndiensten) was extended to Gutsbezirke 
and towns alike. 72) 
As for the roads under the jurisdiction of local communities, Gutsbezirke and Land-
gemeinden were responsible for construction and maintenance within their respective 
district. However, by virtue of the agreement concerning compensation and separation 
concluded for the purpose of regulating the relationship between Gutsherr and peasants 
and also division of the common land, the obligation was shared between Gutsherr and 
Gemeinde in such a way that the former would provide for construction materials while 
the latter was to supply all labor, which tended often to transfer substantially the entire 
part of the obligation to the Landgemeinde.73) 
(4) Notwithstanding the resistance of the conservatives, the Landgemeindeord-
nung proposed by Herrfurth was finally adopted by a majority of 206 to 99 in the Prus-
sian Lower House on June 1, 1891, and the Upper House also approved the bill on June 
13 by a majority of 99 to 38 after an open vote. 74) In the Lower House vote, the bill was 
opposed by all members of the Conservative Party, one of the Center Party (Das Zentrum), 
von Schalscha and another member of the Liberal Conservative Party, Spangenberg, 
while all members of the Liberal Party, National Liberal Party and Polish Party, plus 
the Center and Liberal Conservative Parties excluding one dissident in each named 
above, and two independent members, von Koller and Cremer=Teltow. Thus, the 
Landgemeindeordnung came into effect as part of the Prussian internal policy referred to 
as "the New Course", as the result of the Liberals' victory over the conservatives' resistance. 
However, the reform by Herrfurth failed to produce much meaningful results, just as 
Loening predicted at that time, saying that the law only gave a "legal possibility"75) to 
implement the reform and in practice, it would face severe resistance. 
Herrfurth was said to have had the intention to dissolve at least one half of the 16,000 
or more Gutsbezirke then existing in the eastern provinces, but the conservatives at least 
succeeded in forestalling the objective. 76) This reform could not be implemented without 
consent of the Kreisausschuss77) on which large landowners had a decisive influence, and 
furthermore, establishemnt of the Farmers' League (Bund der Landwirte) closely follow-
ing the enactment of the Landgemeindeordnung vigorously attacked "the New Course" 
policy and tried to realize a conservative reorganization of Prussian German politics. 
72) Ibid., S. 209, 210 Anm. I. 
73) Ibid., S. 210. 
74) Schultluss' BUTopaischer GeschichtskalenrkT 1891, Munchen 1892, S. 93, 98. 
75) E. Loening, op. ci ., S. 206. 
76) J. Ziekursch, ZieleJ Krafte und Gestaltung cler inneren Politik des Reiches, in: Volk und Reich deT 
Deutschen, Bd. r, Berlin 1929, S. 132. 
77) E. Loening, op. cit., S. 204. 
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It was only natural that the real impact of Herrfurth's reform was extremely limited under 
these circumstances. Molt explains this situation as follows: "there were approx. 8,000 
Gutsbezirke which were intended for dissolution into Landgemeinden, but in reality, 
only 641 out of 15,612 Gutsbezirke had disappeared by the outbreak of the First World 
War. This means that the status-based structure of Prussian local government remained 
in full power and strength until the Revolution of 1918. For instance, 36% of the total 
population in Pomerania lived without enjoying any right under local self-government, 
and so it was for 28% of the population in Posen, and for 20% of the entire rural popu-
lation of Prussia. These people, who lived as dependents of Gutsherren, were the natural 
reservoir to support the political hegemony of large landowners". 78) 
Incidentally, the number of the dissolved Gutsbezirke varies from one source to 
another. Kitzel, for instance, says that during the fifteen years following the enactment, 
there were 708 Gutsbezirke eliminated and 305 which were newly established, so that the 
net decrease was only 40379), but von Dallwitz, the Minister of the Interior, stated in the 
Prussian Lower House in 1913 that 964 Gutsbezirke had been dissolved since 1892,80) and 
the number is larger than the one quoted by Molt. At any rate, however, it was clear 
that the task was carried forward after the First World War. 
IV 
The Proclamation to the Nation, issued by the Prussian Government dated Novem-
ber 13, 1918, stated that administrative reform was one of the most important tasks of the 
new government, and emphasized: "democratization of all administrative bodies, elimi-
nation of Gustbezirke, completely equal suffrage for both sexes in the elections of 
representatives for municipal and rural communities, and corresponding democratic 
remodelling of the administrative bodies in counties and provinces".81) Dissolution of 
Gutsbezirke, one of the major ideals of the new government, was achieved at last in 1927, 
nine years after the Proclamation, under the law titled "Gesetz iiber die Regelung ver-
schiedener Punkte des Gemeindeverfassungsrechts vom 27. Dezember 1927". 
The bill concerning new municipal and rural communities (Stiidte=und Land-
gemeindeordnung) was published by the Prussian Government on March 30, 1922, and 
in December of the same year, another bill relative to a new Landgemeindeordnung was 
submitted to the Landtag, but it was pigeonholed and never came through. In January 
10, 1925, the same bill as. was submitted at the end of the preceding Landtag session was 
re-submitted by the Center Party (Das Zentrum) -the so-called "Urantrag Herold"-, 
and the bill was considered several times by the house committee in the course of 1926 
and 1927. 
78) Peter Molt, DeT Reichstag VOT Jer improvisierten Revolution, Koln 1963, S. 119. 
79) K. Kitzel, op. cit., S. 236. 
80) Sten. Ber. (13.Jan. 1913), S. 93\0. 
81) Gerhard A. Ritter/Susanne Miller (Hrsg.), Die deutsche Revolution 1918-1919. Dokumente, Hamburg 
1975, S. \05. 
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The major issues of dicussion were formation of the Landbiirgermeisterei (the federa-
tion of rural communities without losing their own independence) and the dissolution of 
Gutsbezirke. We shall now review these two issues, with reference to the summary of 
comments made by each party on the "Urantrag Herold" made at the committee sessions 
of April 13-15, 1926, and January 5, February 2-3, 1927. 
(I) With regard to the Landbiirgermeisterei, (a) the German Nationalist Party 
(Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP) criticized it as quite obsolete, unacceptable to 
all parties other than the Social Democratic Party, and that the Social Democratic Party 
was ignorant of the situation in the eastern provinces. DNVP would approve of those 
already existing Landbiirgermeistereien in Rhine Province, Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein 
and other provinces but it must reject any attempt to extend the application to other parts 
ofPrussia.82) (b) the German People's Party (Deutsche Volkspartei, DVP) was basically 
in agreement with DNVP, but pointed out that people's dislike for the Landbiirgermeiste-
rei was quite prevalent in Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein, and insisted that the bill must 
have some provisions which would enable the system to be abolished if necessary.83) 
(c) The Zentrum supported the bill, criticizing that the allegation of DNVP and 
DVP was nothing but one-sided representation of the opinions of people from the east, 
but at the same time, the party pointed out that much of the basic premises which had 
been thought to justify the Landbiirgermeisterei in the past were actually in the process of 
extinction. In other words, because those tasks such as electric power supply, social 
welfare, construction of roads and others which had previously been entrusted to local 
communities were gradually taken over by the large organizations concerned, local com-
munities would progressively lose the urge to promote development of Biirgermeistereien. 
For this reason, the Zentrum maintained that Rhine Province and Westphalia, where the 
institution was in existence, should decide at their provincial Landtag whether it should 
yet be allowed to continue.84) 
(d) The German Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei, DDP) was 
skeptical about the validity of the opinion held by the Zentrum. DDP was sympathetic to 
the Biirgermeisterei as it existed in the western provinces and stated that the institution 
should not only be maintained in the west but the possibility to introduce it into the east 
must also be left open, although coercive introduction of the Biirgermeisterei into entire 
part of Prussia should be avoided, at least until such time as it was beyond doubt that 
the institution, if introduced, would benefit the east too.85) 
(e) The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) 
was the most assiduous promoter of the Landbiirgermeisterei. The party stressed that 
introduction of this institution would mean major progress in the east too, as there was 
urgent need to have those numerous Landgemeinden in the east, which lacked all financial 
82) Sammlung der Drucksachen des Preussischen Land/ags, 13. Bd., Drucksachen Nr. 6260A, Berlin 1928, S. 
7070-7072. 
83) Ibid., S. 7071f. 
84) Ibid., S. 707lf. 
85) Ibid., S. 7072, 7074. 
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capability for services, combined into the Biirgermeisterei which would be in a much 
more confortable position in that respect. SPD argued that the east's objection to the 
Biirgermeisterei was motivated by political reasons, since these people knew exactly how 
the institution would strengthen the life of the Landgemeinde and its independence. 86) 
(f) The Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD) argued that 
the federation of rural communities (Biirgermeisterei) would not result in any saving 
of expenditures, and that the integration of rural communities (Eingemeindung) should 
be the only correct choice87), thus showing clearly its posture to oppose the SPD. 
(2) Now, with regard to the issue of dissolution of Gutsbezirke, the political parties 
took the following positions: (a) DNVP argued that transformation of Gutsbezirke 
into Landgemeinden could be undertaken only when the former had lost their uniry of 
possession. When such a prerequisite condition did not exist in a particular Gutsbezirk, 
the latter would have to be maintained. 
A DNVP member of parliament, in this connection, recounted I\is own experience as 
an ex Landrat. He had been in this position in Ost=Prignitz County of Brandenburg 
Province in 1919 when the abolition of Gutsbezirke and their integration into Landge-
meinden became an issue in this region. As the Landrat, he asked the opinion of about 
70 village mayors (Gemeindevorsteher) of the Landgemeinden and all of 36 chiefs of the 
Gutsbezirke (Gutsvorsteher) in the county, and it turned out that only two each of the 
Gemeindevorsteher and Gutsvorsteher approved of integration while all the rest were 
categorically opposed to it. Not only did the owners of Gutsbezirke want independence 
of their districts, but the majority of the Landgemeinden feared, above all, the charge of 
road construction and that of bridges in particular; they were also afraid of an increase 
in the political strength of floating population consisting of farm workers in large Guts-
bezirke etc., which would have the effect of altering the constitution of traditional 
Gemeindevertretung (village assembly), leading to the loss of a decisive voice on the part 
of old families of landed peasants. For these reasons, they did not like at all the idea of 
combination with Gutsbezirke. 
In view of these experiences, DNVP was against the forced integration of Gutsbezirke 
and Landgemeinden, and stressed that the Gemeindevertretung of a Landgemeinde 
should have the right to decide whether the integration would be accepted or not, as well 
as the right to file an objection to any proposed integration. According to DNVP, there 
was nothing surprising in the fact that in East Prussia, more than 4,000 Landgemeinden 
were opposed to the combination with Gutsbezirke, and if Gutsbezirke were dissolved 
by force, it would give rise to a storm of indignation on the part of Landgemeinden 
themselves. The position of DNVP was partly wishful thinking, but the party was 
nonetheless against the dissolution of Gutsbezirke in principle.88) 
(b) DVP pointed out that the bill left many things to be desired inasmuch as the 
86) Ibid., S. 7071. 
87) Ibid., S. 7073. 
88) Ibid., S. 7075f., 7078ff. 
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procedures for dissolution of Gutsbezirke were to take place only once and no provisions 
were made for those Gutsbezirke which were to remain; it stated that certain authoritative 
functions still left to owners of Gutsbezirke-such as a kind of police power which author-
ized provisional arrest by the Gutsherr as the deputy oflocal police authorities-must be 
removed, but if these shortcomings were to be corrected, Gutsbezirke should probably 
be allowed to continue their existence. 
DVP also noted the resistance against elimination of Gutsbezirke came not only from 
the Gutsherren but also from the inhabitants of Gutsbezirke and adjacent Gemeinden and 
emphasized that elimination of Gutsbezirke should be done gradually. Even if Guts-
bezirke were dissolved, the question of difference in economlC scale would not disappear 
and there was consequently danger of new conflicts. Moreover, those peasants who had 
been subordinated to Gutsherren were afraid of possible infringement of individual 
freedom due to the economic superiority of owners of estates (Gutsbesitzer) in Gemeinden, 
if Gutsbezirke and Landgemeinden were forced to integrate.B9) 
(c) The Zentrum, including those members who were from the east, thought that 
the Gutsbezirk was an institution no longer compatible with the time and for that reason, 
it must be disbanded as far as possible, except that for those Gutsbezirke consisting of 
heaven and earth only, there was really no way to do so.90) 
(d) SPD considered t'le dissolution of Gutsbezirke as the most important political 
issue and emphasized the following points: (i) For a democratic country, it was an 
intolerable fact that about 12,000 Gutsbezirke continued to exist, leaving its total 
population of approximately 1.2 million without any communal rights whatsoever. 
Gutsbezirke were the stronghold of reactionary conservatives which still supported DNVP, 
and many people were totally ignorant of the real nature of this institution. (ii) In the 
Gutsbezirk, the Gutsbesitzer as chief of the district functioned also as an auxiliary organ 
of the police, and in the case of a large Gutsbezirk, he was the chief of cantonal district 
(Amtsvorsteher), which would enable him to exercise police power over his own laborers, 
employees, tenants and so on. His economic power as an individual would never be 
stronger and more powerful than it was in such a closed Gutsbezirk. (iii) The Gutsbe-
sitzer wanted to keep independence of their Gutsbezirke in which their political power 
consisted. Even though inhabitants of Gutsbezirke, including laborers etc. had been 
allowed to vote for the Reichstag, Landtag, Kreistag and Provinziallandtag, their civil 
rights should also extend to suffrage in communal election. (iv) It was evident that 
Landgemeinden often did not want to integrate with Gutsbezirke, but if a reform had to 
be subject to the will of Landgemeinden, no political reform would be accomplished at 
all. The time, however, required dissolution of Gutsbezirke and if people were afraid 
of a conflict in implementing reform, then there would be no reform to be spoken of.91) 
(e) KPD pointed out that the recent economic situation clearly dictated the large-
scale integration of rural communities (Eingemeindung), and claimed that dissolution 
89) Ibid., S. 7075, 7077. 
90) Ibid., S. 7078. 
91) Ibid., S. 7076f., 7078. 
MODERNIZATION AND LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN PRUSS IAN GERMANY 25 
of Gutsbezirke was a must in order to save inhabitants of Gutsbezirke from further political 
as well as economic disadvantage. 92) 
In the course of the committee's deliberation, the Herold Bill underwent certain 
modifications. As Kleinmeyer ofSPD summarized on the occasion of the second reading 
of the Herold Bill at the Landtag of Prussia on June 22,1927, the original bill had main-
tained both the Landbiirgermeisterei in Rhine Province and the Amtsbezirk in Westphalia 
and required a majority vote of two-thirds at the Provinziallandtag to introduce these 
institutions into other provinces, but the committee changed this provision drastically so 
that the Provinziallandtag could now decide not only on introduction but on dissolution 
of the Landbiirgermeisterei as well. Also, while the committee attached primary impor-
tance to the dissolution of existing Gutsbezirke, it required actual dissolution to be made 
only when the following four restrictive conditions were met, namely, (I) the plan for 
dissolution had already been adopted by the Kreisausschuss (county executive committee), 
Bezirkausschuss (district executive committee), and Provinzialrat (council of the province), 
(2) when the dissolution seemed inconsistent with the basic purpose and impractical, (3) 
if it did not allow development of distinct communal life due to the scarcity of inhabitants 
or geographical distance between places of residence, and (4) when the overall benefit 
expected to be realized did not seem appropriate at all in terms of the disadvantages on 
national economy. 93) 
In conjunction with such deliberations, Wick (Oberursel) said that while SPD 
conceived the Biirgermeisterei as a preliminary step toward the establishment of a unity 
of local communities, it would be impossible to introduce this institution into the eastern 
provinces of Prussia because of the requirement for a two-thirds majority vote at the 
Provinziallandtag. Wick attacked in particular KPD who did not cooperate with others 
in dissolution of Gutsbezirke, by saying that DNVP and DVP were helped by KPD in 
obstructing passage of the bill, notwithstanding the fact that the Landtag had been dealing 
with legislations for communal self-gevernment ever since 1922.94) 
On October 6, 1926, the Prussian Minister of the Interior, Carl Severing was ousted 
from his position and succeeded by Albert Grzesinski on account of his beeing remiss in 
promoting dissolution of Gutsbezirke which was one of the principal interests of Otto 
Braun, the Prime Minister. The new Minister of the Interior in consequence put forward, 
as one of the key tasks of the government, elimination of the Junkers' old privileges which 
still existed in Prussia, by dissolving Gutsbezirke. 95) Thus, while SPD tried to drive for-
ward the Herold Bill along with the Zentrum, DDP and other members of the "Koali-
tionsparteien", DNVP, DVP and KDP attacked the move from both wings. 
Kilian, a member of KPD said that his party was free from all restraints shared by 
the "Koalitionsparteien" and thus it was under no obligation, unlike the other parties 
constituting the right to central wings, to represent the interests of capitalists, and argued 
92) Ibid., S. 7079f. 
93) Sitzungsberichte des Preussischen Landtags (22. Juni 1927), S. 21133f. 
94) Ibid., S. 21135-21141. 
95) Hagen Schulze, Otto Braun od., Preussens demokratische Sendung. Frankfurt/M. 1977, S. 513f. 
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that the working class must be aware of the fact that so long as the capitalistic state was 
in existence, it would be impossible to expect any communal politics that would fully 
respond to the proletarian interests. Based on such a rigid dogmatism, he emphasized 
that the Herold Bill had nothing to satisfy workers' needs with respect to the fundamental 
law applicable to communal self-government, and in particular, the proposed legislation 
provided for nothing but the interest of capitalists in terms of economic activities envisaged 
for local communities, which placed completely in line with the policy of the German 
Association ofIndustry (Reichsverband der Industrie).96) 
Moreover, KPD dared to submit its own bill, known as the "Urantag Pieck" relative 
to dissolution of Gutsbezirke. At the first reading of the bill held on June 29, 1927, in 
explaining the Party's purpose in presenting the bill, Kilian aimed his attack at the SPD. 
Kilian first pointed out that ever since the revolution of November, 1918, admini-
strative reform had been the order of the day, and Severing, who had become the Prussian 
Minister of the Interior in 1920, in spite of his statement that the reform was an urgent 
task, neglected in fact to introduce any reform over the years. He accordingly claimed 
that SPD bad committed a monstrous crime, along with the other ministerialists off ailing 
to crush the reactionary hope of maintaining the ancien regime of the German Empire 
also in the bureaucracy. He said, regarding the dissolution of Gutsbezirke, that if SPD 
had ever been faithful to its slogan to liberate villages and their proletariat, the dissolution 
could have been realized years ago ...... in 1920, 1921 or even in 1923; the Landtag, backed 
up by the pressure of the revolutinary mass, could have carried out the task without dif-
ficulty, although it was no longer easy any more to establish a legislation requiring radical 
elimination of Gutsbezirke. 
Kilian then went on to say that although the provisions of the Landgemeindeordnung 
proposed by Herrfurth were reactionary, it would not be impossible to eliminate most of 
the Gutsbezirke if the government and the ministerialists were firmly determined to dis-
solve the Gutsbezirke, but because the current government was taking a compromising 
attitude and lacked sufficient support from the Koalitionsparteien, it had to seek the 
additional help of the reactionary parties. Kilian also attacked SPD, by saying that it 
never possessed the republican will unlike Napoleon who had completely eliminated from 
Rhineland all Gutsbezirke, strongholds of the reactionary powers in the region. Thus, 
while KPD did consider dissolution of Gutsbezirke as an important political task, it was 
not prepared to let the Landgemeindeordnung be enacted in the form and context desired 
by the Koalitionsparteien. The Communist Party's aim in fighting against the Herold 
Bill was to fight with the "Koalition" in order to disintegrate SPD from the Prussian 
coalition.97) 
Haas (Kbln), a member ofSPD, retorted that ifKPD had not offered help to the right 
wing parties, the Landtag would have enacted already a new and comprehensive 
Landgemeindeordnung in spite of the resistance from the right wing parties. He stated 
that the "Urantrag Pieck" was nothing but a literal transcription from the bills and 
96) Sitzungsberichte (22. Juni 1927), S. 211561£. 
97) Sitzungsherichte (29. Juni 1927), S. 21431-21442. 
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proposals submitted by the ministerialists, prepared for the sake of obstructing the deliber-
ation. Haas declared that, if the policy to enact the new Landgemeindeordnung and 
Stadteordnung and then to prepare the way for enactment of the Kreisordnung as well as 
the Provinzialordnung became frustrated midway, then a new special legislation would 
have to be considered, not only for the dissolution of Gutsbezirke but for other points as 
well. 98) 
After the Herold Bill had suffered a setback as Haas predicted due to objections of 
the two wings, the Koalitionsparteien submitted, on December 6, 1927, a new proposition 
concerning dissolution of Gutsbezirke, details about Landbiirgermeisterei and integration 
of rural communities titled "Urantrag der Abg. Haas (Kaln), Schiiling, Schmiljan und 
Gen. auf Annahme eines Gesetzentwur[s iiber die Regelung verschiedener Punkte des 
Gemeindeverfassungsrechts". The bill was subsequently discussed twice on December 12, 
and was adopted by the majority including the Communist Party, and became a law on 
December 27, 1927.99) 
The Vorwarts, organ of SPD, carried an article titled "Gutsbezirke disappear! A 
Success of the Prussian Government-Failure of Right Wing Obstruction in Parliament" 
to report that most of the 12,900 Gutsbezirke would be dissolved with the result that the 
inhabitants of the Gutsbezirke were to be granted, for the first time, suffrage in communal 
election and the people would be able to exercise their power in the communal election 
scheduled for the spring of the next year, 1928.100) 
According to the law, dissolution of Gutsbezirke would take either one of the three 
procedures as follows: (I) combination with rural community (Landgemeinde) or with 
municipal community (Stadtgemeinde). (2) formation of a new Landgemeinde or Stadt-
gemeinde by integration of another Gutsbezirk, or (3) transformation either on its own or 
in conjunction with others into a Landgemeinde or Stadtgemeinde.101) Each Landrat 
was asked to prepare by January 15,1928, a draft proposal concerning the dissolution of 
all Gutsbezirke within his county. Thereafter, he was to request decisions of the commu-
nities concerned as well as opinions of the owners of Gutsbezirke by February 6. The 
Kreisausschuss, on these bases, was to complete the plan for dissolution by March 12. 
The government explained that it was necessary to set the program quite tightly because of 
the need to give suffrage to inhabitants of the Gutsbezirke by the time of the election of 
local communities scheduled to be held in May, 1928, at the latest. 
98) Ibid., S. 21448-21454. 
99) Ibid., S. 22221ff. According to Schulze, Severing, the Minister of the Interior, made a mistake in 
that he had tried to achieve dissolution of Gutsbezjrke within the framework of the overall Land-
gemeindeordnung, requiring a majority of two-thirds at the Landtag as a constitutional amendment, 
which would have hardly been expected considering the political situation at that time. On the 
contrary, the new proposition on the communal law drafted under his successor, Grzesinski, and sub-
mitted by the Koalitionsparteien, contained only those measures allowed under the constitution and 
for this reason, the bill managed to overcome various attempts of the right wing parties to obstruct 
the proceedings (H. Schulze, DP. cil., S. 576). 
100) VDrwilrls, 13. Dezember 1927, 44. Jg. Nr. 587. 
101) Friedrich Steinberg, Die Au.ftosung tkr Gulsbezirke, Berlin 1928, S. 12. 
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By April 15, the Oberprasidenten had submitted confirmation of the dissolution of 
Gutsbezirke to the Ministry of State, and whereupon, the latter undertook the final 
review.102) As of January I, 1928, there were still 11,894 independent Gutsbezirke in 
Prussia along with approx. 29,000 Landgemeinden and 1,000 Stadtgemeinden, but most 
of those Gutsbezirke were dissolved soon after the law came into force on September 
30, 1928, and as of August I, 1930, there were only 275 remaining, most of which being 
the large Forstgutsbezirke.103) 
Not much is known as to what type of conflicts occured in the course of the dis-
solution, except for facts recorded in documents of the Geheimes Staatsarchiv. 104) Also, 
considerable time to have been spent in coordinating interests between the parties con-
cerned.105) In my opinion, however, the most enlightening statement concerning the 
historical significance of dissolution of the Gutsbezirke would be the one made by Hans 
Rosenberg, which goes as follows: "it was only in 1927 that the residues of Gutsherrschaft 
as an administrative institution were finally removed by the dissolution of kinightly estates 
which had been functioning as independent districts of local administration and local 
police organization. Thus, the Weimar Rebublic at last succeeded in depriving Gross-
agrarier oftheir aristocratic privileges and of the symbol of their exclusive domination." 106) 
Thus, towards the end of the Weimar Republic, the dissolution of Gutsbezirke abo-
lished finally the dual structures existing in local self-government in the eastern part of 
Prussia, and this served as an important step in the modernization of Piussian Germany. 
Nevertheless, the dissolution of Gutsbezirke did not link up with remodelling of industrial 
structures in the east by means of large-scale internal colonization, and while top priority 
should have been given to such a structural change as a means of overcoming the serious 
unemployment problem caused by the Great Depression which began in 1929, the 
Weimar Republic collapsed and the Nazi regime succeeded it. The one-time Prussian 
Minister of the Interior, Herrfurth, stressed that the State's legislation should be directed 
"into the villages" (auf die Darfer) in response to the same slogan of the Social Democratic 
Party. Neither the Social Democratic Party nor the Weimar Republic, however, succeed-
ed in implementing the slogan in practice. It was the Nazis who achieved wide penetra-
tion among the peasantry.107) 
102) Ibid., S. 22. !f. 
103) Ulrich von Dassel, Aufgeloste Gutsbezirke in der Auseinanderset;:.ung, Berlin 1934, S. 1. 
104) Example [I] The Landrat of Tel tow county in the vicinity of Berlin submitted on October 15, 1928, 
a document to the Prussian Minister of Justice containing opinions of the Kreisausschuss concerning 
dissolution of Gutsbezirk Diippel. The City of Berlin, owner of this Gutsbezirk, had previously 
proposed to absorb it into the city itself, but the Cabinet decided to integrate Diippel with other related 
Landgemeinde and thus it remained in Teltow county. Later aD, the Cabinet tried to change the 
decision, and the document stated that the Kreisausschuss unanimously resolved to protest against 
the Cabinet policy in defense of its fundamental interest (Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Preussischer Kulturbesitz, 
P. 135, Rep. 84a Nr. 10094. 182 a-d). 
Example (II) Grzesinski, the Prussian Minister of the Interior, circulated a document datedJanuary 
28,1929, to the Prime Minister and other Cabinet members concerning the dissolution ofGutsbezirke. 
The document reports about objections raised by the Ministers of Agriculture and of Commerce 
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against the plan drawn by the Mlnister of the Interior to dissolve the three Gutsbezirke of Woltin· 
gerode (Kreis Goslar), Gottesgnaden (Kreis Calbe) and Lauchhammer (Kreis Liebenwerda), and the 
failure to establish a compromise between the Ministers involved. 
(I) Wtiltingerode was a Gutsbezirk belonging to the Klosterkammer Hannover (946 ha, popula-
tion 356), in which a new shaft of the Herzynia potassium plant in Preussag was located. The 
Minister of the Interior was in agreement with the opinion hdd by the Kreisausschuss and the Re· 
gierungs. and Oberprasidenten that the Gutshezirk could be combinated with the adjoining Land-
gemeinde Vienenburg. The economic ties between the Gutsbezirk and the Landgemeinde, as well 
as other relationships in the matter of church and schools, supported the view. Moreover, Vienen-
burg was essentially a village consisting of homes of people working for the Herzynia shaft without 
much financial capability, so its tax revenue had to be increased. The proposal of the Minister of the 
Interior was therefore consistent with the Cabinet policy to combinate residential community with 
entrepreneurial community in order to achieve an equilibriwn of financial burden between different 
commumtIes. The Minister of Agriculture, on the contrary, took the view that the Gutsbezirk should 
be integrated with Gemeinde Wiede1ah. The Minister of the Interior said that there were no re-
cognizable economic and cultural relationships between Woltingerode and Wiedelah, and there was 
no reason to strengthen the latter either. He recommended to the Cabinet, in consequence, not to 
divide Woltingerode but to combinate it with Vienenburg. 
(2) The Minister of the Interior proposed to break up Gutsbezirk Gottesgnaden (875 ha, population 
344), ofwhich the main part was to be integrated, into the adjacent city of Calbe, while the Vorwerke 
Trabitz and Kolno, located for apart, were to be integrated into their adjacent Gemeinde of Trabitz 
and Zuchau, respectively. The Minister of Agriculture objected to the division and proposed instead 
that it should be integrated into another Gemeinde of Schwarz, because in his opinion, the integration 
with Galbe would make the tax burden on the demesne of the Crawn of Gottesgnaden an excessively 
heavy one. In spite of the objection, however, the Cabinet was recommended to adopt the Minister 
of the Interior's proposal. 
(3) Gutsbezirk Lauchhammer (1,125 ha. population 1,251) was mostly an agricultural and 
forestry area, but a small part of it also had industrial characteristics because there were facilities of 
Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke, and most of the inhabitants lived in this area. The Landgemeinde of 
Naundorf was located at a distance of I or 2 km. Some of the employees of Lauchhammerwerk 
lived in the company housing colonies within the industrial area, while others were living in Naundorf. 
Because of these circumstances, the Minister of the Interior, the Regierungs- and Oberprasidenten 
all agreed that the industrial area should be combinated with Naundorf in order to combine the 
entrepreneurial community and the residential community of workers. The Minister of Commerce, 
on the other hand, thought that Lauchhammerwerk should be converted into a Landgemeinde by 
annexing the adjacent parts of the Gutsbezirk. The Minister of the Interior, however, was against 
it. He thought it was unnecessary to establish a new Gemeinde in the limited area, and proposed to 
divide Gutsbezirk Lauchhammer so that Griinewalderlauch, situated much apart, could be combi~ 
nated with Landgemeinde Grunewalde, which the remaining part would be integrated into Land-
gemeinde Naundorf (Geheimes SIMlsaTchiv, P. 135, Rep. 84a Nr. 10094, 2-7). 
The Minister of Commerce, in his comment dated February 13,1929, and circulated to the Cabinet 
members, took a stand against the Minister of the Interior, stating that while he was in agreement with 
the Minister of the Interior to combine as far as possible an entrepreneurial community and a residen-
tial community for the workers when a Gutsbezirk was to be dissolved, in this particular case, he could 
not find any such relationship between Gutsbezirk Lauchhammer and Gemeinde Naundorf. Among 
those approximately 3,000 employees and workers of Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke. less than 720 lived 
in Naundorf, and others lived in different villages. Of those others, no more than 6l2lived in Lauch-
hammer itself, although, in addition, 211 workers of Bubiag (Braunkohlen- und Brikett-Industne 
A. G.) also lived in Lauchhammer. Under these circumstances, it would be a mistake to consider 
Naundorf as the residential community of the Lauchhammer workers, or conversely, to say that the 
latter constituted the entrepreneurial community ofNaundorf, because in Naundorfthere were several 
hundred inhabitants working for other enterprises. On the other hand, Lauchhammer had 1,208 
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inhabitants which made it one of the largest Gutsbezirke and suitable for constituting an independent 
community on its own. It had its own schools, churches, facilities for sports, welfare and social 
actIVIties. Moreover, 626 people representing 94% of the total eligible voters, regardless of their 
political or social position, signed a petition for communal independence of Lauchhammer. The 
Minister of Commerce concluded, on these grounds as well as in consideration of financial and other 
aspects, that the most desirable solution would be to convert Lauchhamrner into an independent 
community (Geheimes Staatsarehiv, P. 135, Rep. 84a Nr. 10094, 10-12). 
The Minister of Education also circulated a document dated February 18, 1929, to the Cabinet 
members involved concerning the dissolution of Gutsbezirk Woltingerode, stating that in view of the 
conflict of opinion between the Minister of the Interior, who wanted to integrate the Gutsbezirk with 
Gemeinde Vienenburg, and the Minister of Agriculture who proposed the combination with 
Gemeinde Wiedelah, he now decided to ask for transfonnation of the Gutsbezirk into an independent 
Landgemeinde, which was his original position in the matter (Geheimes Staatsarchiv, P. 135, Rep. 84a 
Nr. 10094, 13). 
According to Grzesinski's circular to the Cabinet members dated March 28, 1929, concerning the 
dissolution of Gutsbezirk Gottesgnaden (Krei. Calbe), the Minister of the Interior stated that the 
Cabinet's decision was to combinate it with Landgemeinde Schwarz without dividing it, in recognition 
of the opposition of the Minister of Agriculture (Geheimes Staatsaremv, P. 135, Rep. Ma, 17). 
Example (III) A document submitted on July 26, 1929, by Gemeinde Egger.dorf to the Prussian 
Minister of Justice contains the following request on the matter of dissolution of Eggersdorfer Forst= 
Forstbezirk "Riidersdorfer Forst". According to the Cabinet decision of December 7, 1928, the 
Forstbezirk "Riidersdorfer Forst" would not be dissolved, and the dissolution was limited to the part 
of Eggersdorf-Peterhage~ only. Consequently, the Landrat drew up a new plan calling for partial 
integration of Eggersdorfer Forst-the northern part and two exclaves located in Eggersdorf village-
into Gemeinde Eggersdorf, and the Gemeinde approved the plan on February 12, 1929. However, 
the city of Strausberg also wanted a part of the aforementioned territory-mainly the railway station 
of Strausberg and a GeHinde directly connected to it. This was because the station carried the city's 
name, and some of the children of the local railroad employees went to the city high school. More-
over, the city maintained. a streetcar service between it and the station which were 7 km apart. 
However, this part had the largest tax payment capability and the only residential zone of the area, 
and Gemeinde Eggersdorf must, for this reason, ask for integration of this area, also considering 
various traditional ties it had with this area and its geographical location. The Cabinet Order of 
December 7, 1928, should be interpreted. to mean that a residential area separated from a remaining 
Gutsbezirk was to be combinated with an adjacent Gemeinde. It was clear that the actual communal 
life could take place only in conjunction with Gemeinde Eggersdorf and not with Strausberg. The 
Kreisausschuss agreed, that year and also in the preceding year, to combine this area with Eggersdorf. 
The Forestry Department, originally supportive of this, had later changed its position unreasonably. 
Thus, since there was the fear that the station and the Gelande might be assigned to the city, the 
Gemeinde had no alternative but to request fair treatment of its own interest and that the railway 
station be combinated with the Gemeinde (Geheimes Staatsarchiv, P. 135, Rep. 84a, 19-22). 
105) It has been known that a great deal of difficulty was experienced in the course of dissolving Gutsbezirke 
particularly in resolving conflicts over sharing of burden between the owners of Gutsbezirke and 
Gemeinden. For instance, in the case of Standesherrschaft Muskau, 15 Gutsbezirke belonging to it 
had to deal with two cities and 24 Gemeinden. As an example of such difficulty, due to the dissolution, 
approx. 120 km out of 420 km of public road passing through Gutsbezirke before their dissolution was 
transferred to Gemeinde's charge, and a conflict occurred concerning the charge to maintain a bridge 
(Spreebriicke in Sprey) and could not be resolved until the Landrat finally made the decision on 
March 31, 1940 (vgl. Hermann Grafvon Arnim & Willi A. Boelcke, of>. cit., S. 462f). 
106) H. Rosenberg, Probleme der deutsehen Sozialgeschiehte, Frankfurt/M. 1969, S. 19. 
107) cr. Eiji Ohno, Nachisu no Nogyo Koryo (The Agricultural Program of the Nazis), in: "Keizai-
&nsii" (The Economic &view) Vol. liS, No. 1'2, 1975, pp. 1-24. 
